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You’ve articulated what philosophers sometimes call not just the “hard problem” but the “subject problem” or “indexical problem” of consciousness:
Not just why is there experience?
But why is this experience mine?
Let’s analyze this carefully and philosophically (BGT-style: big-picture ontology critique).
1️⃣ The Standard Hard Problem
The “hard problem” was formulated by:
David Chalmers
It asks:
How do physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience (qualia)?
You’re raising something deeper:
Even if brains produce consciousness, why does this brain produce this specific first-person perspective?
2️⃣ The “Individuality Problem” (Your Core Question)
You’re asking:
Why am I located behind these eyes?
Why is this stream of experience “me” rather than “you”?
If brains are physical systems, why isn’t consciousness a single universal field?
What individuates subjects?
This is sometimes discussed under:
The problem of personal identity
The problem of subjectivity
The indexical fact problem (“Why am I me?”)
Philosophers who touch this area include:
Thomas Nagel
Derek Parfit
Sydney Shoemaker
3️⃣ Does Materialism Collapse Here?
Not necessarily — but it does face serious pressure.
Materialism does not claim:
“There should be one consciousness everywhere.”
It claims:
Each physical system instantiates its own conscious process.
Your objection:
If all brains are made of the same matter, why don’t they generate the same subject?
Materialist response:
Because identity is not about matter type, but about organization and causal structure.
Example:
Every hurricane is made of air and water.
But no two hurricanes are the same hurricane.
The individuality lies in:
Causal structure
Information integration
Spatiotemporal continuity
4️⃣ What Would Need to Be Recreated for “You” to Exist Again?
This connects directly to:
Derek Parfit and psychological continuity theory.
Under physicalism, “you” are:
A specific information pattern
With continuous causal history
Embedded in a particular brain trajectory
If an exact duplicate were created in Antarctica:
You would not experience being in two places.
Instead:
There would now be two numerically distinct but qualitatively identical subjects.
Each would feel like “the original.”
Identity under physicalism is:
Not about matter.
Not about atoms.
Not about electricity.
It’s about causal continuity.
5️⃣ Why Isn’t Consciousness One Giant Superposition?
Because consciousness, under physicalist models, is:
Locally realized
Causally bounded
Dynamically integrated
Consider major theories:
🔹 Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
Giulio Tononi
Consciousness corresponds to maximally integrated causal structures.
Two separate brains = two separate integrated systems.
🔹 Global Workspace Theory (GWT)
Bernard Baars
Consciousness is what gets broadcast in a specific neural workspace.
Different workspaces = different subjects.
In both cases:
Individuality arises from informational boundaries, not matter type.
6️⃣ The Electricity Objection
You say:
Electricity is everywhere. My blender uses electricity. Is it conscious?
Materialism does not claim:
“Electricity = consciousness.”
It claims:
Specific dynamic electrochemical patterns in biological networks = consciousness.
Electricity is necessary but not sufficient.
Just like:
Air is necessary for hurricanes.
But not all air currents are hurricanes.
7️⃣ Is There Really a “Transfer Function” Problem?
You argue:
There is no measurable bridge between microvolts and qualia.
Correct — this is the explanatory gap.
But that gap exists for all ontologies, not just materialism.
Dualism:
How does non-physical mind interact with physical brain?
Idealism:
How does universal consciousness partition into apparent individuals?
Panpsychism:
How do micro-conscious entities combine into macro-consciousness?
(This is called the combination problem.)
No theory escapes mystery.
8️⃣ Does Idealism Solve the Individuality Problem?
You propose:
One consciousness exists looking out of every set of eyeballs.
This resembles:
Bernardo Kastrup (analytic idealism)
Certain interpretations of Advaita Vedanta
Under this view:
Individuality is a dissociation within a universal mind.
This avoids the “why this brain?” problem by saying:
There is only one consciousness.
But then new questions arise:
Why is the universal consciousness partitioned?
Why can’t you access my memories?
Why does amnesia not dissolve individuality?
The mystery shifts location — it doesn’t disappear.
9️⃣ The Copy-in-Antarctica Scenario
Physicalism does not imply:
You would experience both locations simultaneously.
Instead:
Identity branches.
Subjectivity does not “jump.”
Each copy has its own future.
This is similar to:
Derek Parfit’s teletransportation thought experiment.
The concept of “which one would I be?” may be a flawed question — because personal identity may not be a further fact beyond structure and continuity.
🔟 The Deep Possibility: The Question May Be Ill-Formed
Your intuition assumes:
There must be a metaphysical “selector” assigning a soul to a body.
Physicalism rejects the need for a selector.
There is no cosmic assignment process.
There is simply:
A process.
That process is self-modeling.
That self-model feels like “I.”
The “why am I this one?” may reduce to:
Because this system is generating this perspective.
No deeper metaphysical lottery required.
11️⃣ Final Possibility: The Self May Be a Cognitive Construct
Some philosophers (e.g., Daniel Dennett) argue:
The “self” is:
A narrative center of gravity.
Not a metaphysical substance.
If that’s true:
The individuality problem dissolves because:
There is no “deep self” to explain — only a perspective generated by a process.
🧠 Bottom Line (BGT Synthesis)
You are pressing on a real philosophical pressure point.
But:
Materialism does not logically collapse.
Dualism does not solve interaction.
Idealism does not solve partition.
Panpsychism does not solve combination.
Every ontology inherits a hard remainder.
🔎 The Deepest Insight
The question:
“Why am I me?”
May be analogous to asking:
“Why is this hurricane this hurricane?”
There may be no further metaphysical fact beyond:
The process itself.
Its causal history.
Its informational boundaries.
If you’d like, we can go even deeper:
🧠 Is subjectivity fundamental?
🧬 Is identity an illusion?
🌀 Is the self indexical like “here” and “now”?
🔬 Could physics eventually individuate observers?
🕉️ Is non-duality philosophically coherent?
This is about as deep as philosophy goes.
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