AS

 This text explores Śaṅkara’s Advaitic critique of the Buddhist Vijñānavādin (Yogācāra) school, specifically focusing on the nature of perception and the "externality" of objects.

Here is a summary of the core arguments presented in the passage:

1. The Distinction Between Perception and Object

Śaṅkara argues against the idealist view that experience is merely a series of "subjective grasps." He insists that for experience to be coherent, we must distinguish between:

• The Act of Perception: The internal mental process (seeing).

• The Object of Perception: The external entity being perceived (the tree).

He contends that we don't just perceive "sensory modes"; we perceive objects through those modes. To claim the object is identical to the perception is to ignore the inherent structure of how we experience the world.

2. The Critique of "As If External"

The Buddhist philosopher Dinnāga argued that objects are internal constructions that merely appear "as though external." Śaṅkara latches onto this phrase as a logical failure:

• He argues that the very use of the phrase "as though external" proves that we have a fundamental conception of externality.

• If we had no experience of truly external things, the comparison ("as though") would be meaningless.

3. The Material of Experience

Śaṅkara maintains a unique middle ground:

• Non-Realist Premise: He agrees that truth is tied to experience (rather than a world totally independent of cognition).

• Realist Conclusion: However, he asserts that the "material of experience" demands the admission of external objects. To deny this is to lose the "dual aspect" of experience (subject and object).

4. The Dream Analogy

The passage contrasts how Śaṅkara and the Buddhists use dreams to explain reality:

• Vasubandhu (Buddhist): Uses dreams to show we can have cognitive experiences without external objects.

• Śaṅkara's Rebuttal: He points out the "relational dissimilarity" between waking and dreaming. He notes dryly that if dreams were equivalent to waking reality, a man dreaming of a far-off land would wake up there. For Śaṅkara, the "material" and consistency of waking experience set it apart from the fleeting nature of dreams.

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Would you like me to clarify Śaṅkara’s specific arguments against the Buddhist concept of ālambana (causal support) mentioned in the text?