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Here’s a Summary-Bullet-Quote (SBQ) for “On Consciousness and Beyond” by Evangelos Legakis (Page 2):
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Summary:
Legakis explores the complex topic of consciousness through an interdisciplinary lens, bridging neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical views with Buddhist doctrines. He aims to investigate "essence consciousness" by integrating scientific inquiry with Buddhist principles like emptiness (Suññatā) and dependent co-arising (paṭiccasamuppāda). The essay also examines intentionality—our mind’s directedness toward objects—linking it to consciousness and drawing from both Western philosophy (Brentano, Searle) and Buddhist understanding.
Bullet Points:
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Consciousness is studied across neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and Buddhism.
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The focus is on merging scientific views with Buddhist teachings on Suññatā and paṭiccasamuppāda.
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Introduces the concept of "essence consciousness."
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Intentionality is central: consciousness is always “about” something.
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Brentano defined mental phenomena as having “intentional inexistence”—an internal directedness unlike physical phenomena.
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Searle and Buddhist thought both recognize intentionality as fundamental to consciousness.
Quote:
“Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself... This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena.”
— Franz Brentano, 1874, pp. 88–89
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Here is the SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond for Evangelos Legakis – An Interdisciplinary Approach to Consciousness and Intentionality:
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Evangelos Legakis – An Interdisciplinary Approach to Consciousness and Intentionality
Summary:
Legakis presents a holistic exploration of consciousness by weaving together scientific and Buddhist perspectives. His approach emphasizes the convergence of neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy with the Buddhist doctrines of emptiness (Suññatā) and dependent co-arising (paṭiccasamuppāda). Central to his inquiry is the concept of intentionality—the quality of consciousness being directed toward something—drawing on foundational insights from Franz Brentano and John Searle. Legakis suggests that modern science and ancient Buddhist teachings are no longer at odds but offer cooperative frameworks to understand the nature and essence of consciousness.
Bullet Points:
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Consciousness is examined through an interdisciplinary framework combining science and Buddhism.
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Neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy contribute alongside Buddhist concepts of emptiness and interdependence.
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The essay proposes a unifying idea called "essence consciousness".
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Intentionality is the key concept uniting mental phenomena: consciousness is always directed at something.
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Brentano introduced intentionality as a defining trait of mental (not physical) phenomena.
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Searle’s view of intentionality complements both Western and Buddhist insights.
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The work advocates a cooperative relationship between scientific and spiritual doctrines in understanding consciousness.
Quote:
“Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself... This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena.”
— Franz Brentano, 1874, pp. 88–89
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Here is a comprehensive Summary-Bullet-Quote (SBQ) for Evangelos Legakis’s essay “On Consciousness and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Consciousness and Intentionality”.
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Evangelos Legakis – An Interdisciplinary Approach to Consciousness and Intentionality
Summary:
Evangelos Legakis presents a nuanced exploration of consciousness by integrating perspectives from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and Buddhist teachings. He emphasizes the convergence of scientific inquiry with Buddhist doctrines, particularly the concepts of emptiness (Suññatā) and dependent co-arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), to delve into the nature of consciousness. Central to his discussion is the concept of intentionality, the idea that consciousness is always directed toward something, drawing from the works of Franz Brentano and John Searle. Legakis introduces the notion of “essence consciousness”, proposing a unified framework that transcends disciplinary boundaries.
Bullet Points:
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Consciousness is examined through an interdisciplinary lens, combining neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and Buddhist teachings.
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Buddhist concepts of emptiness (Suññatā) and dependent co-arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) are central to understanding consciousness.
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The essay introduces the concept of “essence consciousness” as a unifying framework.
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Intentionality is highlighted as a fundamental characteristic of consciousness, emphasizing its directed nature.
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Franz Brentano's concept of "intentional inexistence" distinguishes mental phenomena from physical ones.
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John Searle's perspectives on intentionality align with both Western philosophy and Buddhist insights.
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The work advocates for a cooperative relationship between scientific and spiritual doctrines in understanding consciousness.
Quote:
“Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself... This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena.”
— Franz Brentano, 1874, pp. 88–89
For a more in-depth understanding, you can access the full essay here: On Consciousness and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Consciousness and Intentionality.(Academia)
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Here is the SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond for the next section of Evangelos Legakis’s essay, focusing on the impermanent nature of information-flow and perception:
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Section: Impermanence, Information-Flow, and Perceptual Systems
Summary:
Legakis examines the impermanent and dynamic nature of information, redefining it as “information-flow” to reflect its temporal and spatial flux. He distinguishes between ‘facts’ (as latent experiential data) and the elementary forms that transmit information—from subatomic particles to mental constructs like thoughts and “thoughtforms.” Drawing from both Buddhist and scientific viewpoints, Legakis argues that perception arises through stimulation of the senses, with information being more essential than sensation itself. He supports this with insights from Day R. H. and J. J. Gibson, highlighting that the senses function not just as passive receivers but as active systems for detecting both external and internal stimuli. He also introduces the term “inroundings” to describe the inner experiential space of organisms, expanding the traditional notion of internal and external perception.
Bullet Points:
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Information is impermanent and better described as “information-flow”—a continuous movement through space and time.
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Facts are described as latent experiential data, not necessarily known or learned in advance.
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Elementary forms include both the physical (atoms, subatoms) and the mental (thoughts, thoughtforms).
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Stimulation is defined as electromagnetic, mechanical, or chemical input that carries environmental and internal data (Day, 1969).
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Perception is not merely about sensory input but about the pickup of information, as emphasized by Gibson (1996).
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The senses are dual-purpose: channels for sensation and systems for perception.
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Introduces the term “inroundings” to describe the organism’s inner world as distinct yet interdependent with the external environment.
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Immeasurable information constantly bombards receptor cells, shaping perception and experience.
Quote:
“The information is what counts but the sensation is incidental.”
— J. J. Gibson, 1996, p. 142
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Here is the next SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond for the section focusing on perception, information-flow, and Gibson’s distinctions:
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Section: Perceptual Meaning, Sense Consciousness, and Gibson’s Models of Perception
Summary:
Legakis builds on the concept of information-flow by explaining how it is received, interpreted, and transformed into perception through a process influenced by both physical and psychological mechanisms. Referencing Gibson’s linear model (1966), he outlines a sequence from environmental input, through physical laws and sensory stimulation, to sense consciousness and perceptual understanding. This model aligns with the Buddhist principle of dependent co-arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), showing how perception is contingent on various interrelated factors. Legakis also introduces Gibson’s three types of perception—general, economical, and mediated—and elaborates on the distinction between sensation-based and information-based perception. Crucially, Gibson argues that perception can occur without conscious sensation, emphasizing that perception may be driven purely by stimulus information without sensory awareness. Legakis interprets this as a differentiation between perception grounded in sensory processing and that which is pre-conscious or subtle in nature.
Bullet Points:
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Information-flow follows a linear pathway: environmental input → medium of transference → sensory stimulation → psychological resonance → perception.
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This model shows how perception depends on both external stimuli and internal processing.
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The process reflects dependent co-arising—phenomena arise interdependently.
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Three types of perception (Gibson, 1966):
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General perception: the normal sensory-driven process.
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Economical perception: focused attention by avoiding distractions.
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Mediated perception: perception influenced by another’s information (e.g., warnings).
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Gibson distinguishes two types of perception:
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Sensation-based perception: driven by active sensory engagement.
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Information-based perception: occurs without direct sensation, through passive receptors or unconscious stimulus detection.
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Perception can occur without entering consciousness as sensation, but rather as pure information.
Quote:
“There is perception without sensation to occur because stimulus information-flow can determine perception without having to enter consciousness in the form of sensation but it enters in the form of information.”
— J. J. Gibson, 1966, p. 3
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Here is the SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond for the section addressing unconscious perception, invariance, and phenomenological views:
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Section: Unconscious Conclusions, Invariant Perception, and Phenomenological Sensation
Summary:
Legakis deepens the exploration of perception beyond conscious awareness, drawing from Helmholtz’s concept of “unconscious conclusions”, where perception operates beneath conscious cognition yet still informs the organism's state. He emphasizes that such perceptions arise from stimulated receptors that do not necessarily engage conscious processes. Gibson supports this, proposing that invariant perception—recognizing objects consistently despite changing stimuli—depends on the observer’s ability to extract perceptual constants from sensory flux. This resonates with the Buddhist notion of impermanence, where reality is ever-shifting, yet perceived as stable through cognitive structuring. Legakis also brings in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, which challenges the idea of objective perception by asserting that all experiences are ultimately filtered through the subject’s internal states. He concludes that sensation is both an inward and outward transmission of information, echoing Buddhist views that recognize sensation as part of a threefold experiential process.
Bullet Points:
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Perception can occur without conscious awareness but still guides behavior (Helmholtz’s “unconscious conclusions”).
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Receptors may be stimulated without triggering conscious sensation, supporting subconscious perception (Gibson, 1966).
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Invariant perception: the brain recognizes stable realities despite fluctuating sensory input.
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The perceiver constructs subjective or objective reality by identifying invariants among impermanent stimuli.
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This supports the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, where constant change underlies apparent stability.
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Merleau-Ponty critiques sensationalism, arguing that all we ever perceive are states of ourselves.
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Sensation is described as both inward and outward—informing the organism and shaping its expressive interface with the world.
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Buddhist philosophy expands on sensation as a threefold phenomenon, implying a more holistic and layered understanding of perception.
Quotes:
“These unconscious conclusions derived from sensation are equivalent in their consequences to the so-called conclusions from analogy.”
— H. Helmholtz, Treatise on Physiological Optics
“The active observer gets invariant perceptions despite varying sensations.”
— J. J. Gibson, 1966, p. 3
“Sensationalism ‘reduces’ the world by noting that after all we never experience anything but states of ourselves.”
— Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. xvii
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Here is the SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond for the section discussing vedanā (sensation) from the Buddhist and philosophical perspectives:
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Section: Vedanā – Sensation, Feeling, and Experience in Buddhist and Philosophical Contexts
Summary:
Legakis bridges the psychological and philosophical discourse on sensation with the Buddhist concept of vedanā, highlighting its nuanced meaning. Vedanā, found in both the aggregates (skandhas) and the dependent co-arising formula, is commonly translated as sensation, but also encompasses feeling and experience. Drawing from sources such as the Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism, Boisvert (1992), and Nyanaponika Thera (2013), Legakis emphasizes that vedanā is not mere passive sensory input, but includes a psycho-physiological dimension—it involves knowing, feeling, and experiencing, both physically and mentally. He differentiates vedanā from emotion, which arises from feelings but includes cognitive elaborations such as likes, dislikes, and attachments. Philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and Stcherbatsky also address bare or pure sensation, expressing skepticism about its existence in isolation, as sensation is always colored by additional mental factors like ideas, volitions, and feelings. Thus, vedanā becomes a dynamic interface between raw stimuli and the organism’s interpretative processes.
Bullet Points:
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Vedanā (Pali): translated as sensation, feeling, and experience.
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It is both a mental and physical faculty of experience.
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Found as the second aggregate and the sixth factor in dependent co-arising.
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Boisvert (1992): vedanā comes from vedeti – “to know” or “to experience”.
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Nyanaponika (2013): distinguishes bare sensation (pleasant/unpleasant/neutral) from emotion, which adds likes/dislikes and mental elaboration.
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Merleau-Ponty (2002): critiques the philosophical grounding of sensation, calling it nominal and contiguously associative.
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Stcherbatsky (1922): argues pure sensation never exists in isolation—it is always accompanied by mental phenomena like volition and ideas.
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Vedanā captures the integration of sensation, cognitive awareness, and emotional potential.
Quotes:
“We must stress that our use of the term ‘sensation’ as a translation for vedanā does not refer to an anoetic sentience, or a bare experience devoid of personal inclinations.”
— Boisvert, 1992, pp. 81, 83
“Feeling (Pali: vedanā) is the bare sensation noted as pleasant, unpleasant (painful) and neutral (indifferent)... It should not be confused with emotion.”
— Nyanaponika Thera, 2013
“Pure sensation could never appear in life in its true separate condition; it was always accompanied by some secondary mental phenomena.”
— Stcherbatsky, 1922, p. 18
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Certainly! Continuing with the SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond, we now delve into the section discussing vedanā (sensation) from the Buddhist and philosophical perspectives:
SBQ – On Consciousness and Beyond
Section: Vedanā – Sensation, Feeling, and Experience in Buddhist and Philosophical Contexts
Summary:
Legakis bridges the psychological and philosophical discourse on sensation with the Buddhist concept of vedanā, highlighting its nuanced meaning. Vedanā, found in both the aggregates (skandhas) and the dependent co-arising formula, is commonly translated as sensation, but also encompasses feeling and experience. Drawing from sources such as the Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism, Boisvert (1992), and Nyanaponika Thera (2013), Legakis emphasizes that vedanā is not mere passive sensory input, but includes a psycho-physiological dimension—it involves knowing, feeling, and experiencing, both physically and mentally. He differentiates vedanā from emotion, which arises from feelings but includes cognitive elaborations such as likes, dislikes, and attachments. Philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and Stcherbatsky also address bare or pure sensation, expressing skepticism about its existence in isolation, as sensation is always colored by additional mental factors like ideas, volitions, and feelings. Thus, vedanā becomes a dynamic interface between raw stimuli and the organism’s interpretative processes.
Bullet Points:
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Vedanā (Pali): translated as sensation, feeling, and experience.
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It is both a mental and physical faculty of experience.
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Found as the second aggregate and the sixth factor in dependent co-arising.
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Boisvert (1992): vedanā comes from vedeti – “to know” or “to experience”.
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Nyanaponika (2013): distinguishes bare sensation (pleasant/unpleasant/neutral) from emotion, which adds likes/dislikes and mental elaboration.
-
Merleau-Ponty (2002): critiques the philosophical grounding of sensation, calling it nominal and contiguously associative.
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Stcherbatsky (1922): argues pure sensation never exists in isolation—it is always accompanied by mental phenomena like volition and ideas.
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Vedanā captures the integration of sensation, cognitive awareness, and emotional potential.
Quotes:
“We must stress that our use of the term ‘sensation’ as a translation for vedanā does not refer to an anoetic sentience, or a bare experience devoid of personal inclinations.”
— Boisvert, 1992, pp. 81, 83
“Feeling (Pali: vedanā) is the bare sensation noted as pleasant, unpleasant (painful) and neutral (indifferent)... It should not be confused with emotion.”
— Nyanaponika Thera, 2013
“Pure sensation could never appear in life in its true separate condition; it was always accompanied by some secondary mental phenomena.”
— Stcherbatsky, 1922, p. 18
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