p is q
qualia
"Taking a closer look at P-consciousness, we need to ask what exactly is happening. How is the qualia actually being realized? If I register a color or a sound or a scent, a series of chemical and neural cascades are being activated in my body, just as they were for those species that would have been our very early ancestors. Evolutionarily, these cascades would probably have evolved and been perpetuated because they kept those animals alive for a better chance of passing on their genes to future generations, including you and me
concept of P-consciousness brings up is what’s known as “the problem of other minds.” (Block refers to this as “the harder problem of consciousness.”) This is the epistemological notion that while we can observe others’ behavior, we can’t truly experience what they experience and so can never actually prove anyone but ourselves is conscious in this regard.
"computers and robots that think but don’t feel. Their states are A-conscious, but not P-conscious.” In other words, A-consciousness allows them to reason, but their lack of P-consciousness prevents them from feeling.
"Like an endocrine system or an appendage, I think consciousness would have slowly developed across untold generations, successively selected for within the population according to the advantages it accorded certain individuals relative to particular environmental conditions and pressures."
Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) is considered a much more difficult problem in the field of psychology and cognitive science for a number of different reasons. The nature and basis of experiencing a sensation—be it the redness of a rose, the lilt of a laugh, or the scent of the ocean—is as difficult to explain as it is to prove. Philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers refers to this as “the hard problem of consciousness,”
concept of P-consciousness brings up is what’s known as “the problem of other minds.” (Block refers to this as “the harder problem of consciousness.”) This is the epistemological notion that while we can observe others’ behavior, we can’t truly experience what they experience and so can never actually prove anyone but ourselves is conscious in this regard.
"computers and robots that think but don’t feel. Their states are A-conscious, but not P-conscious.” In other words, A-consciousness allows them to reason, but their lack of P-consciousness prevents them from feeling.
"Like an endocrine system or an appendage, I think consciousness would have slowly developed across untold generations, successively selected for within the population according to the advantages it accorded certain individuals relative to particular environmental conditions and pressures."
Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) is considered a much more difficult problem in the field of psychology and cognitive science for a number of different reasons. The nature and basis of experiencing a sensation—be it the redness of a rose, the lilt of a laugh, or the scent of the ocean—is as difficult to explain as it is to prove. Philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers refers to this as “the hard problem of consciousness,”
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