A
The scriptural approach relies on scriptural authority as the
basis for the claims it makes regarding the nature of the
ultimate reality. This reality is regularly referred to in the
Upanisads as Brahman.
The Upanisads, however, make several pronouncements
regarding the nature of the objective world, the nature of
the individual subject and the nature of the ultimate reality
(Brahman), with the result that “there are great, almost
insurmountable difficulties in deciding what exactly is the
teaching of the Upanisads in certain important respects. This
accounts for the emergence in later times of diverse schools
of Vedanta, all of which claim to propound the Upanisadic
teaching”.’ It is also worth adding that:
The vagueness of Upanishadic teaching is
particularly in reference to the relation of
Brahman to the individual soul on the one hand,
and to the physical universe on the other.
Though... statements about their identity are many
and prominent, those distinguishing them are not
altogether wanting. The first problem to solve for
any one attempting to systematize the teaching of
the Upanishads is accordingly to harmonize these
two sets of statements.‘
Each system of Vedanta has evolved its own method of
harmonizing these statements on the underlying assumption
(contained in Brahmasutra 1.1.4) that these Upanisadic
teachings have to be understood in a unified way. Advaita
18 Advaita Vedanta
Vedanta, as a system of Vedanta, has devised its own
understanding of the Upanisads in keeping with this
assumption.
It was noted above that the Upanisads seem to contain
two streams of thought: one which recognizes the diversity
of the objective universe, the subjective individual and the
ultimate reality (Brahman) and another which emphasizes
their unity. The great exponent of Advaita Vedanta :
Samkara recognizes, that there are two streams of
thought in the Upanishads; but he thinks that one
of them, viz. that which affirms the reality of
diversity, is only a concession to empirical modes
of thought. All diversity being thus only
conditionally true, the only teaching of the
Upanishads, according to him, is that of unity.
Since, however, there can be no unity apart from
variety, he does not describe his teaching as
monism but only as “non-dualism” (advaita).’
How, it might now be asked, does Sankara achieve such a
result?
He achieves this outcome through an exegetical
manoeuvre according to which the Upanisads are said to
contain certain key statements called mahavakyas, and
through the subsequent claim that their teachings as a whole
are to be understood through the lens of these seminal
utterances. It is like claiming that if one wants to understand
the New Testament, this is best done in the light of the
overarching statement that “Jesus is the Messiah”. All other
parts of the New Testament which do not directly confirm
this—as when Jesus asks Peter: who do you think I am?—or
when Jesus wonders on the cross whether God has forsaken
him—are all to be understood subject to the mahavakya:
“Jesus is the Messiah”.
These mahavakyas, in the light of which the Upanisads
should be understood according to the hermeneutical
tradition of Advaita Vedanta, are the following:
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 19
I. All this is verily Brahman.
II. I am Brahman.
III. This Atman is Brahman.
IV. That thou art.
To this a fifth is sometimes added:
V. Brahman is spirit (or consciousness) .
These statements, however, need to be understood with
extreme exegetical care, for they can be easily
misunderstood. Indeed these mahavakyas are accepted as
authoritative by other schools of Vedanta as well, so it is not
so much the fact of singling out these statements as
mahavakyas as their understanding within Advaita Vedanta,
which sets this system apart from other schools of Vedanta.°
All This is Verily Brahman
The reader will, for instance, note that this first statement
identifies the objective universe with Brahman. The reader
will also note that the second statement (J am Brahman)
identifies the individual with Brahman. However, the exact
manner in which the objective universe 1s held to be identical
with the Brahman; and the individual subject (or jiva is held
to be identical with Brahman, are not identical.
Before explaining this difference, it is necessary
to draw attention to an important distinction
between two types of illusion in common
experience. A person may fancy that he sees a
serpent at a distance, while closer scrutiny reveals
to him that it is only a rope. The latter or
correcting knowledge, like practically all
knowledge of the kind, affirms the existence of
something; but it contradicts that object as which
(1.e., serpent) that something appeared before.
He says to himself or feels when he discovers his
error: “It is a rope, not a serpent.” Again a person
looking at a white conch through a sheet of yellow
glass, of whose existence he is not aware, takes it
20 Advaita Vedanta
to be yellow. But a suitable change in his
standpoint will disclose to him that the yellowness
belongs to the glass and not to the conch. Here
also, as in the previous case, the later knowledge
affirms the existence of some reality; unlike it,
however, it does not deny the object as which it
appeared, viz. the conch, but only an aspect of it -
its yellowness. He still sees it as a conch, but only
adds that it is white and not yellow. The illusion in
the first case consists.in mistaking a given object
for another that is not given; in the second, it
consists merely in attributing to an object which is
given, a feature that does not really belong to it,
though it also is presented at the time. But for the
interposition of the sheet of glass (upadhz) to which
the yellow actually belongs, there would be no
illusion at all in the latter case. Now these types of
illusions serve to illustrate the difference in the
manner in which, according to Sankara, one and
the same Brahman comes to appear both as the
world and as the individual self (jzva). It gives rise
to the illusion of the world, as the rope does to
that of a serpent in the first example. ’
The relationship of the jzva to Brahman, however, must
be explained with the help of the other example, for the
“Jiva is not false or illusory as the world is.” Rather it is “its
limitations which are false,” and “these limitations, which
are really its empirical adjuncts, appeared transferred to it,
as in our second example of illusions, the yellowness of the
glass appeared transferred to the conch.” As a result:
The ultimate truth, as realised by a jivanmukta,
denies the world while affirming the underlying
reality of Brahman which is given in all
presentations as positive being (sat) and with which:
we may therefore be said to be constantly, though
not consciously, in touch. The individual self, on
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 21
the other hand, is not illusory in this sense. It is
Brahman itself appearing through media or
limiting adjuncts (updadhi) like the internal organ
(antahkarana) which, we may state by the way, are
all elements pertaining to the physical world and,
as such, are illusory. Or, to state the same
otherwise, the individual self when seen sub specie
aeternitatis, is Brahman itself. When this fact is
realized in one’s own experience, what is denied
is not the jeva as a spiritual entity, but only certain
aspects of it, such as its finitude and its separateness
from other selves. Its conception may thereby
become profoundly transformed, but the
important point is that it is not negated (badhita)
in the same way in which the physical world is. It
is, on the other hand, reaffirmed, though only as
Brahman. We cannot thereby say that the
individual self is false (mzthya), as we may that the
world is false. We can only say that it is not truly
the agent, the enjoyer, etc.''
The overall picture which emerges on the basis of this
discussion may be presented succinctly as follows:
We now know the advaitic world-view in general.
Brahman is the sole reality, and it appears both as
the objective universe and as the individual subject.
The former is an illusory manifestation of
Brahman, while the latter is Brahman itself
appearing under the limitations which form part
of that illusory universe."
I am Brahman
The second statement, “I am Brahman” must now be
examined in more detail. The subjective individual — the J—-
is regularly referred to in Advaita as the jivatman, or jiva for
short. The importance of this compound form will become
clear at the end of this exposition, although the term
22 Advaita Vedanta
giwvatman will be referred to as jiva during the exposition for
the sake of brevity.
In the case of the distinction between the first two
mahavakyas—one which identified the Brahman with the
universe and the other which identified it with the jzva—it
turned out to be the case that although both were said to be
identical with Brahman, the exact nature of this identity was
not identical. The clue to the understanding of the second
mahavakya and the kind of identity it involves is provided by
the fact that although the jzva is referred to as anadi, or
beginningless, from both an empirical and a transcendental
point of view, this “beginninglessness” in the two cases is not
identical in nature.
It was noted earlier that the notion of the jiva is “that of a
complex (visista), and points not only to an element which
is identical with Brahman, but also to limiting adjuncts like
the internal organs.” It is important to keep this in mind as
we proceed. The empirical reality about the jzva consists of
the fact that it is caught up in the process of samsara, bound
by its karma, or actions.
Here no doubt, a question will be asked as to when
the responsibility for what one does first occurred.
But such a question is really inadmissible, for it
takes for granted that there was a time when the
self was without any disposition whatsoever. Such
a view of the self is an abstraction as meaningless
as that of mere disposition which characterises no
one. The self, as ordinarily known to us, always
means a self with a certain stock of dispositions;
and this fact is indicated in Indian expositions by
describing karma as beginningless (anadz). It
means that no matter how far back we trace the
history of an individual, we shall never arrive at a
stage when he was devoid of all character."
This is one sense in which the jva is anddi, or beginning-
less. The other sense in which it is anadi, or beginningless,
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 23
may be identified by asking the question: does the jiva, in its
true nature, undergo any change in the process of being
involved in the universe? In this context:
It is desirable to distinguish further between actual
and apparent change. Actual change (parinama)
signifies that when a particular thing is destroyed,
it does not disappear entirely. A rope when pulled
to pieces remains as fibres. A pot, when broken,
exists as potsherds. In apparent transformation
(vivarta), on the other hand, the disappearance
is complete. When the illusion of “serpent” is
overcome, there will be nothing of ztleft. It remains
only to add that the jzva is not an effect in either
of these senses. It is not a real transformation, nor
even an illusory appearance of Brahman, so that
no principle of causation is at all involved there. If
we yet speak of the individual self as born, we only
mean that its adjuncts like the physical body come
into being and not the spiritual element in it.
Hence the jzva is described as beginningless
(anad1). It is, as already indicated, Brahman
appearing in an empirical dress.’
The distinction between the nature of this example with
the one cited earlier should be noted. In the first example
the difference between the two illusions—of the rope-snake
and tinted-conch—consisted of the fact that while in the
case of the rope-snake, what is not given at all (snake) was
taken as given, in the case of the tinted-conch, only a feature
of the conch, the yellow-tint was taken as given when not
given. The conch as such is given forever, and because it is
given for ever, no concept of change, whether apparent or
actual, applies to it. [t is not the argument that the white
conch was transformed into a yellow conch and when the
error was discovered, was transformed back into a white
conch, when the yellow colour was removed. The yellow colour
was never part of the conch.
24 Advaita Vedanta
Anything which is beginninglessness is assumed under
normal philosophical assumptions to be endless, i.e. eternal.
So we discover that the jzva is eternal in two senses: (1) It is
eternal in the sense that it is part of samsara which, as a
process is eternal, (2) it is eternalin the sense that it is identical
with Brahman, which is eternal. It is perhaps because it is
eternal in both the senses that it can be referred to as jzvatman.
As the permanently still witness to its eternally fluctuating
fortunes the jzvatman is known as the saksiz or witness; the
permanent as the witness of the constant.
But this leads to the view that there can be two kinds of
eternalities. Such indeed is the case.
In Indian philosophy two kinds of eternity are
distinguished, a) kutastha nityata and b)
pravaharupa nityata. A thing is kutastha nitya if it is
unchanged forever, while a thing is pravaharupa
nitya if though incessantly changing it does not
alter its pattern (nzyatt). Roughly speaking, a rock,
for example, has the former kind of reality, anda
river the latter kind. The nature of a river is to
flow incessantly, and so long as it does not swerve
from this nature of its, it may be said to be mutably
real; though not enduringly real as a rock.”
The jtva part of sivatman partakes of pravaharupa-nityata,
and the atman element in it partakes of kutastha-nityata.
Thus when it is said that “Iam Brahman”, it is not the jzva
but the atman element of the complex which is referred to.
Be it also noted that the statement “aham brahma asmi,” (J
am Brahman) while it may lead to the conviction that all
spirit is one, “leaves out of account the entire physical
universe”'’, thereby indicating the importance of the first
mahavakya.
Atman is Brahman
We turn now to the third mahavakya: that atman is Brahman.
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 25
One may begin by recognizing the importance of this
identification in the light of Vedic and Upanisadic literature.
M. Hiriyanna writes:
Thus Brahman means the eternal principle as
realized in the world as a whole; and atman, the
inmost essence of one’s own self. These two
conceptions—Brahman and atman—are of great
importance and occur not only independently in
the literature of this period, but are sometimes
corelated with each other; and their parallelism is
pointed out by representing the self of the world
as related to the physical universe in the same
manner in which the individual self is related to
the body. Thus in Atharva Veda, the universal self
or world-soul is stated to have “the earth for its
feet, the atmospheric region for its belly, the sky
for its head, the sun and moon for its eyes and the
wind for its breath.”"
He then goes on to say:
The two conceptions are also sometimes identified;
and it is this happy identification of them that
constitutes the essential teaching of the
Upanishads. They mean that the principle
underlying the world as a whole, and that which
forms the essence of man, are ultimately the same.
Here ended the long Indian quest for the
pervasive cause of all things—the search, as the
Upanishads express it, for “that by knowing which
all will be known.” Passages descriptive of Brahman
alone or of atman alone occur frequently in the
Upanishads; but they are not peculiar to them,
being also found in the earlier literature. Their
explicit identification, on the other hand, is
specifically Upanishadic."
What, however, is the philosophical importance of this
identification apart from its textual significance?
26 Advaita Vedanta
The answer to this question is best provided by the
perspective that the search for the ultimate reality in the
Upanisads followed two routes: an external route and an
internal route. The external approach was represented by
the search for the ultimate ground of the external universe.
The following passage from the Upanisads provides a glimpse
of such an approach in operation:
The regressus to Brahma, the ultimate world-ground.
Then Gargi Vacaknavi questioned him. Yajnavalkya, said
she, since all this world is woven, warp and woof, on water, on
what, pray, 1s the water woven, warp and woof?
‘On wind, O Gargl.’
‘On what then, pray, is the wind woven, warp and woof?’
‘On the atmosphere-worlds, O Gargi.’
‘On what then, pray, are the atmosphere-worlds woven,
warp and woof ?’
‘On the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gargl.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the Gandharvas
woven, warp and woof ?'
‘On the worlds of the sun, O Garg!.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the sun woven,
warp and woof ?’
‘On the worlds of the moon, O Gargt.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the moon woven,
warp and woof ?’
‘On the worlds of the stars, O Gargt.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the stars woven,
warp and woof ?’
‘On the worlds of the Gods, O Gargl.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of the Gods woven,
warp and woof ?’
‘On the worlds of Indra, O Garg1.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of Indra woven, warp
and woof ?’
‘On the worlds of Prajapati, O Gargi.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of Prajapati woven,
warp and woof ?’
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 27.
‘On the worlds of Brahma, O Gargi.’
‘On what then, pray, are the worlds of Brahma woven,
warp and woof ?’
Yajnavalkya said: ‘Gargi, do not question too much, lest
your head fall off. In truth, you are questioning too much
about a divinity about which further questions cannot be
asked. Gargi, do not over-question.’
Thereupon Gargi Vacaknavi held her peace.”
The internal route took the form of the search for the
ultimate ground of one’s being or personality.
But what was the essential self of man? The term
introduced into Vedic inquiry was the common
word for “self,” aiman, used generally as a reflexive
pronoun. From this general usage, adtman was given
a more specific meaning as the essential part of
man, his basic reality. At times this was taken to be
the body or the trunk of the body as distinguished
from the limbs. Gradually, however, the adtman was
distinguished from the gross physical body; it was
the znner self, the principle or entity that gave man
his essential nature.”!
The following Upanisadic passage (Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad IV. 1-6) also provides a useful scriptural if simple
illustration of this kind of an internal approach.
The light of man is the soul
1. Yajnavalkya came to Janaka, [king] of Videha. He
thought to himself: J will not talk.
But [once] when Janaka, [king] of Videha, and
Yajnavalkya were discussing together at an Agnihotra,
Yajnavalkya granted the former a boon. He chose
asking whatever question he wished. He granted it to
him. So [now] the king, [speaking] first, asked him”
2. Yajnavalkya, what light does a person here have?
He has the light of the sun, O king, he said, ‘for with the
28
or
Advaita Vedanta
sun, indeed, as in his light one sits, moves around,
does his work, and returns.’
‘Quite so, Yajnavalkya.
‘But when the sun has set, Yajynavalkya, what light does
a person here have?’
‘The moon, indeed, is his light,’ said he, ‘for the
moon, indeed, as in his light one sits, moves around,
does his work, and returns.’
‘Quite so, Yajnavalkya.
‘But when the sun has set, and the moon has set, what
light does a person here have?’
‘Fire, indeed, is his light,’ said he, ‘for with fire,
indeed, as in his light one sits, moves around, does his
work, and returns.’
‘Quite so, Yajnavalkya.
But when the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, and the moon
has set, and the fire has gone out, what light does a
person here have?’
‘Speech, indeed, is his light,’ said he, ‘for with speech,
indeed, as in his light one sits, moves around, does his
work, and returns. Therefore, verily O king, where
one does not discern even his own hands, when a voice
is raised, then one goes straight towards it.’
‘Quite so, Yajnavalkya.
But when the sun has set, Yajnavalkya, and the moon
has set, and the fire has gone out, and speech is
hushed, what light does a person here have?’
‘The soul (atman), indeed, is his light,’ said he, ‘for with
the soul, indeed, as in his light one sits, moves around,
does his work, and returns.”
Elsewhere in the Upanisads a more detailed analysis of
the human personality is carried out in an attempt to identify
the atman. One such analysis is characterised by its division
of the human person into five sheaths, while another focuses
on the states of consciousness experienced by the human
being.
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 29
Ce The Taittiriya Upanisad (2. 1-6) speaks of the five sheaths
or kosas, which the human personality may be said to consist
of. “In this passage an attempt is made to analyze man at five
levels—proceeding from the grosser forms to the subtler,
and, therefore, more real forms. The real man transcends
the physical, vital, mental, and intellectual aspects and even
the beatific aspect. It is in the end suggested that the real
self of man is identical with Brahman, the ultimate principle,
the absolute, which is its raison d’étre’.””’
Similarly, in another account (Chadndogya Upanisad 8: 7-
12) “the real essential self is successively identified with the
bodily self, the dream self, and the self in deep sleep, and it
is suggested that all these three teachings are quite
inadequate, for none of the three conditions, namely, of
wakefulness, of dream and of deep sleep, can the nature of
the self be said to conform.” The point is pressed that “the
real self is neither body, mind nor complete negation of
consciousness. The self is certainly conscious but of nothing
else but itself. It is pure self consciousness as such and it is in
this condition that it is identical with the highest reality.””
This
picture is fully elaborated in the Mandukya Upanisad.”
State of Consciousness State of Self
Waking Vaisvanara
Dreaming Taijasa
Deep Sleep Prajna
The Fourth Atman
In the foregoing passages one notices how, as a result of
going inward within the human personality, the Upanisadic
seers identified the Atman, as the real self, whether such an
exercise focused on the constituents of the self (as in the
case of the five sheaths) or on the states of consciousness
experienced by the self (namely waking, dreaming and deep
sleep). One needs to remind oneself now that as a result of
going outward into the universe, the Upanisadic seers
identified its real basis as Brahman, while looking inward the
30 Advaita Vedanta
Upanisadic thinker realised the inner self to be Atman.”’
Now the great discovery the Upanisads made was of the
identity of the ground of the universe with the ground of
our own being. Ainslie Embree elaborates this point with
the help of three passages cited below. In the first he
describes the quest of the ultimate ground of the objective
universe, in the second of the individual subject. The two
are brought together in the final passage.
1) In their quest for some ultimate ground for the
world of natural phenomena, of time and space,
and of human existence, the Upanishadic sages
came to the conception of brahman, an
undeniable, impersonal, unknowable power.”
2)Over against the questions concerning the
ground of the external world are to be set those
that probe inward, asking what is meant by the
concept of the Self. The Self could be identified
with the physical body, or “food,” as some of the
Upanishadic thinkers were inclined to say. But
consciousness, breath, will, all had claims to be
regarded as the Self, and all were unsatisfactory as
final definitions. What was needed was something
that could be identified as being beyond change,
something that was in fact immortal. This was
found in the conception of the atman.”
3)In the macrocosm of the universe, the sages saw
brahman; in the microcosm of their own being they
saw the atman. The realization that there is no
distinction between the two, that the ground of
one’s own being is identical with the ground of
the universe, is the great discovery of the
Upanishadic thinkers. “Whoever thus knows, / am
brahman,” declares the sage, “becomes this all.
Even the gods have not the power to prevent him
from becoming thus, for he thus becomes the self.”
It should be carefully noted that this is not
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 31
described as merging with the divine or union
between God and man or reaching a state of unity.
It is rather a recognition that there is no “divine”
as distinct from the individual, no being over
against the self, no process of becoming what once
was not, but only the knowledge of the truth that
always existed.”
This identification of atman and brahman may be said to
strengthen both, as it were. M. Hiriyanna points out, for
instance, that the approach to the ultimate reality via
Brahman runs into some difficulties:
Such a principle need not be spiritual in its nature,
and may well be a material or physical entity.
Further, an objective conception like the above is
little more than a hypothesis to account for the
origin of the universe; and as there is nothing
compelling us to regard it as actually existing, there
being no logical absurdity in denying it. Some
thinkers already seem to have done so in the
Upanishadic period and maintained that ‘in the
beginning this world was just non-being.’”
Similarly, the approach to the ultimate reality via diman is
also not free from difficulties:
If we start from the idea of the self, instead of that
of Brahman, we meet with a similar difficulty, for,
while the self points to what is spiritual and is an
incontrovertible certainty, it is, as known to us,
necessarily limited in its nature. Whatever view we
may take of its nature, it is determined on one
side by the world of nature, and on the other by
the other selves.”
But when the two are identified they seem to have the
effect of helping overcome each others’ shortcomings. It
was pointed out that Brahman as such might appear too
hypothetical to be real. But by “its identification with adtman
the establishment of the spiritual character of this principle
32 Advaita Vedanta
and the removal of the uncertainty about its existence are
both accomplished.”” Similarly, it was hinted that the atman
may appear too personal, to the point of being limited, and
finite, if very real; “it is this deficiency of finiteness that is
made good by its identification with Brahman or the allcomprehensive first cause of the universe.”TM
This identification of atman and brahman is capable. of
being interpreted in several ways. Troy Wilson Organ notes
some of these in the following passage:
The question to be asked first is about the meaning
of the connective “is.” The word “is” has at least
five logically discernible meanings: 1) predication,
e.g., “This apple is green”; 2) class inclusion, e.g.,
“Fido is a dog”; 3) class membership, e.g., “Brown
pelicans are vanishing”; 4) equality, e.g., “Iwo and
two is four”; 5) identity, e.g., “IV is [equivalent to]
4.” Atmanis Brahman seems to be a form of identity
or equivalence. There are many classes of identity:
1) absolute physical identity, e.g., “A is identical
with A”; 2) relative physical identity, e.g., identical
twins; 3) same entity at various stages of
development, e.g., Joe Doakes as boy and J.D. as
man; 4) same species, e.g., Harry Truman as man
and Herbert Hoover as man; 5) same being in
different contexts, e.g., Jane as mother and Jane
as wife; 6) whole and part, e.g., a cup of water
dipped from the Atlantic Ocean and the Atlantic
Ocean; 7) appearance and reality, e.g., a
photograph and the person of whom it is a
photograph; 8) the same object considered from
different perspectives, e.g., the duck-rabbit
example of perception. Probably the last subclass
of identity is the identity of Atman and Brahman:
Atman is Totality viewed internally; Brahman is
Totality viewed externally.”
The main point to note here is that the identity must be
Advaita Vedanta: A Scriptural Approach 33
understood ontologically. The passage cited above helps
explain what is meant by identity. It is equally important to
realize what is not meant by identity. First, when it is claimed
in Advaita Vedanta that Atman is Brahman, it is not claimed
that Atman becomes Brahman, as, for example, in a moment
of realization. If anything, the realization consists of the fact
that Atman is Brahman, was Brahman, and will ever be
Brahman. The point may be explained with the help of the
parable “Like the King’s Son,” in which “a prince, brought
up as a hunter from infancy, discover[s] afterward that he is
of royal blood. It involves no becoming, for he has always
been a prince and that all he has to do is to feel or realize
that he is one.”*”” The metaphysical moral of the whole story
is that there was never a time when the mountaineer was
not the Prince. He did not become a Prince when told he
was one. He already was. He only recognized as a fact
something that was already true.
Second, when it is claimed in Advaita Vedanta that Atman
is Brahman it is not meant that Atman merges into Brahman.
An example from astronomy will be helpful here. For a long
time astronomers identified two distant stars—a “morning
star” and an “evening star,” till it was discovered that both
were Venus. Did it then mean that the morning star merged
into the evening star, or the evening star merged into the
morning star? As both were already and always Venus,
nothing of this sort can be said to have happened.
Third, it is sometimes suggested that “ Atman is Brahman
is not a metaphysical statement but a soteriological
statement.”*’ Consider the following interpretation offered
by Rudolph Otto: “The word is in the mystical formula of
identification [Atman is Brahman] has a significance which
it does not contain in logic. It is no copula as in the sentence:
sis P; it is no sign of equality in a reversible equation. It is not
the zs of a normal assertion of identity.” In order to suggest
what the statement is attempting to express, Otto adds, “For
instance one might say instead of J am Brahman, I am “existed”
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